In seems that one of our own, blogger Tim Johnson of China Rises, (as a side hobby he’s the Beijing correspondent for the McClatchy Newspapers & Junk Bond Imperium/Emporium) has become the target of a vengeful source. Tim recently wrote a piece entitled “China Orders Resettlement of Thousands of Tibetans”, and a Case Western professor of Tibetan Studies, who appears in the article, feels he has been misquoted. Here’s the relevant bits of Tim’s piece. First, the nut graf:
ZENGSHOL, Tibet – In a massive campaign that recalls the socialist engineering of an earlier era, the Chinese government has relocated some 250,000 Tibetans – nearly one-tenth of the population – from scattered rural hamlets to new “socialist villages,” ordering them to build new housing largely at their own expense and without their consent.
Indeed. Very concerning. Here’s his quotes of one Professor Melvyn Goldstein of the Center for Research on Tibet at Case Western University:
“”It’s created a building boom,” said Melvyn C. Goldstein, a social anthropologist and expert on Tibet at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. “I think it’s phenomenally successful, more than I would’ve believed.””
This is followed by a bit about how Human Rights Watch paints a bleaker picture. Then Goldstein is cited again at the end of the article:
“Goldstein noted that the settling of Han Chinese in Tibet’s major cities already has weakened the influence of traditional Tibetan elites. “The cities are a loss,” said Goldstein, referring to demography from a Tibetan point of view. “The last hope is to keep the villages intact. If there’s a battleground for Tibetan identity, it’s in the rural areas.””
When I first read this article, the first thing that leapt out at me was that it reminded me of alot of the ethnonationalism that permeates discussions of Tibet. The article says that the relocation recalls the massive social engineering of an earlier era – but wasn’t it just a few years ago that Peter Hessler wrote in Time Magazine, as did many others, about the forced relocation of Chinese along the Yangtze for the Three Gorges Dam? And didn’t that also mean rural villagers had to give up their way of life – their identity, as Johnson points out Tibetan identity is threatened by relocation? Yet Johnson’s article frames this as a unique crime being perpetrated against one ethnic group in China – Tibetans – using extraordinary measures that have not been used since “an earlier era”, even though less than a decade ago the complaint du jour about China, the catastrophe of the Three Gorges, involved the same problems and Han Chinese citizens? Here, I felt, was the same tired ethnically biased narrative we see about Tibet: the Tibetans suffer in extra-special ways compared to Han Chinese. I am willing to consider that more Tibetans are imprisoned, tortured, denied opportunities and face other forms of severe discrimination. I lived in Xinjiang, and the Uyghurs certainly do. But rarely does anything written about Tibet remark that Han Chinese often suffer the same problems – in fact, the tendency is to make Tibetans out as an isolated and special case.
But before I could write about that, a reader at BoingBoing and acquaintance of Dr. Goldstein submitted Dr. Goldstein’s response to Tim Johnson’s article. And I want to take a moment to tip my hat to Xeni Jardin for posting that readers comment and also linking to my critique of BoingBoing and another post they had. Xeni called me thoughtful. My heart flutters.
Key points of Dr. Goldstein’s complaint are:
1) he never said relocation was “phenomenally successful, more than I would’ve believed”, as the article implies. He said “a marked increase in the standard of living as rural Tibetan families are participating more and more successfully in non-farm income producing jobs for part of the year.”
2) “Initially the government’s idea was to have these new houses built along main roads, but this is not what is going on now in the areas we are conducting research in Shigatse prefecture,” says Goldstein, though Johnson states the government “claims that the new housing on main roads”.
3) Goldstein directly contests HRW’s claim, repeated by Johnson, that “None of those interviewed reported being given the right to challenge or refuse participation in the campaign”, when he wrote “Right now the villagers where we work have a 5 year window to decide whether to participate and rebuild”. Both claims could be correct – Tibet has more than one village. But this was not addressed in the article.
4) While HRW claims that villagers must take out thousands of dollars in loans to rebuild, Goldstein describes loans on a sliding scale based on relative wealth and what sort of housing they choose to construct.
5) Goldstein concludes “Consequently, as a result of this program. there is a building boom in rural areas that is affording rural Tibetans who are carpenters, stone masons, painters, and those who have tractors and trucks etc., increased access to non-farm income, and that is having a very positive impact on the overall standard of living. So in my view, this is a relatively benign program aimed at improving the quality of life and goes along with government interest in speeding up rural electrification, running water programs, etc. That is what I was trying to convey [in a previous interview].”
These quotes are all from an email Goldstein says he sent to Johnson before the article was published. Needless to say, it only furthers my belief that stories about Tibet are trimmed, folded, cut, bent and even broken in order to fit into the slot marked “Brutal Chinese Occupation of Tibet”, because apparently that’s the narrative it has to match. Any complications, grey areas, inconsistencies or problems are elided. When that narrative is repeated so often, do you know how alot of Americans will read such articles? They won’t. They skim it and say “Oh, dear, that Tibet is still suffering [like they did last week, last year, the year before that, ad infinitum]… what’s on the sports page?” And they won’t learn anything new.
As for Dr. Goldstein’s anger at being misquoted, I would suggest considering 1) reporters have editors who sometimes don’t know Tibet from a six-limbed starfish, 2) reporters have deadlines, and 3) remember Brad DeLong and Susan Rasky’s First Rule for Sources: Know Your Customers. The interviewee sets the rules, not the journalist. You can always decline to be quoted.
UPDATE: I contacted Tim Johnson about his article. He declined to comment and stands by the article. Fair enough.
Ah. Now I understand why ESWN likes you so much.
Michael
Dave, you’ve a great ability to breakdown foolish stereotypes, and point out misguided beliefs, not by building up the elements/evils that created those ideas in the first place, but by reminding us that life is a whole lot more complicated than we seem willing to accept.
Thanks man.
There is one big difference between the relocation/rebuilding programmes for Tibetans (one or two of which I also visited recently) and those which affect Han Chinese outside Tibet (and other ethnicities, of course). Tim is right to say that there is a big element of using programmes as a tool for imposing Chinese rule, which is not in question in the other cases.
In particular, the compulsory flying of the Chinese flag over the home (and at least in the cases I visited, putting up posters inside of Mao and other Party leaders) is part of the deal. Villagers are told that if they do not comply, they will be forced to repay any government contribution. The fact that it is part of a government project gives local officials the right to inspect homes at any time afterwards to ensure these conditions are complied with (which means they can also see any signs of loyalty to the Dalai Lama). These may appear symbolic matters, but they are important psychologically, as the government is well aware. Villagers know that in order to get better houses they are agreeing to signify their loyalty to a government which otherwise they regard as foreign, and to downgrade their own national identity to an “ethnicity”. It is a very clever, though not original, piece of psy-ops by the Chinese. (Or hearts and minds, to look at it another way).
@Turton: Yes, he and I both have a crush on Xeni Jardin.
@Humanaught: Thanks, I try.
@Richard: As I said Richard, I’m willing to believe there are differences in treatment. The flag propaganda and surprise inspections definitely count, and I’m sure there are others. But that’s beside the point that Tim has an AWOL source.
When you say the flags are “imposing Chinese rule”, you’re suggesting that before the flags the Chinese ruled less. They’ve ruled for 50 years! You say it “downgrades” their national identity to an ethnicity. Since the invasion, Tibetan has been in reality an “ethnicity”. Only in the imagination has it been a “nation”. Same for the Uyghurs. The flags are yet another reminder – as is the road, schools, hospitals, surprise inspections, ID cards, marriage certificates, arrests, torture, etc. Somehow I think the flags are the least of their worries.
Dave,
I think that’s a bit lame. China’s imposing of its rule is a continuous process as you are well aware, and the housing policy is part of that, as I say. Of course it’s been going on for fifty years.
It’s not up to me to defend Tim’s journalism (he’s a friend, I should say), but I was specifically (and clearly) just taking on your point about ethnonationalism. The issue in Tibet is ethnonationalism. That’s why we journalists focus on it. As you yourself say, what’s going on in Tibet (and Xinjiang) is different than what’s going on elsewhere in China, precisely because of this aspect. In fact, even when it’s the same, it’s different: the British empire occasionally opened fire on protesters in India, China, and indeed Britain. In India, China, it was part of colonialism. In Britain it wasn’t. Same for they way China “redevelops”.
The Three Gorges was an economic project, not social engineering. The Tibetan stuff is partly economic, partly social engineering. That’s pretty clear.
You say the flags are the least of the Tibetans’ problems. I disagree. Many Tibetans I spoke to knew they were getting better off from the Hanification of Tibet but were profoundly conflicted, to use the modern phrase, over what this meant for their identity. It was one of their big issues, because loyalty to the Dalai Lama is such a big part of their identity.
People in the Three Gorges (I spoke to them as well) weren’t conflicted in this way. Some were grateful to upgrade their houses, some weren’t. Some were pissed off because their money had been embezzled. Not many spoke of anything redolent of identity.
Dave —
1. I know Tim and I know he truly strives to get things right. I have no idea whether he got things right in this particular article, but I wanted to mention this.
2. I completely concur with you that the media puts out a story idea (there is no IP protection in China) and then nearly every journalist who writes on the topic follows pretty much the same story line. I have always imagined that the editor tells the reporter, “go to China and have one of your stories be how there is no IP protection there, just like this one here in the New York Times.”
3. Doesn’t the motive for the relocation matter and is it not clear that the motives differ between the 3 Gorges and Tibet?
@CLB/Richard: I’m not saying Tim is a subpar journalist. I’m not attacking, so you need not defend. Rather, I’m making two points about his article.
1) A quoted source has come out and said he was misrepresented, and paints a picture that more or less directly contradicts the article’s thesis. I want this information reconciled – how do you square Goldstein with HRW? I don’t care if Tim Johnson provides that answer or someone else does – but I do think its a critical question.
2) Reporting on Tibet is almost always through an ethnonationalist lens. Again, I’m not attacking Tim, but rather I see a cookie cutter lying around most newspapers. Richard, you even say: “The issue in Tibet is ethnonationalism. That’s why we journalists focus on it.” This is what I mean by a narrative; there are many issues in Tibet. There is only one issue that is “the issue” if journalists generally only cover it, making it “the issue”.
@Richard, when I say the flags are the least of their problems I’m not saying they aren’t conflicted by the CCP’s programs. I’m saying that there are reminders of that problem well beyond the flag, reminders that have real impact on their lives. A flag does not affect your life; a govt marriage certificate, however, most certainly does.
And for the record, I think the word “Hanification” is unhelpful and unclear. What does that mean?
@CLB: Tell me, what do you think the motive is? Do you really think this is part of a campaign to obliterate Tibetan identity and culture? First of all, I don’t believe a nation-state is necessary to have a clear identity, and second of all I don’t think that the government seeks to destroy Tibetan culture. Repression, absolutely, control, absolutely – but is this not what Han Chinese underground Christians face as well?
Three Gorges did not have a local population that believes they should have their own nation. Fair enough; but it did involve moving a couple of million people, destroying entire communities, and radically altering their way of life. How is this not “social engineering”? How is this not destroying a way of life? Just because they’re from the same ethnic group means its not?
There is something worse about putting up a damn that obliterates a culture and putting up a damn that moves hundreds of thousands of people out. I am not saying that is what is happening in Tibet because, quite frankly, I know very little of what is happening in Tibet, but I am saying there is a difference in the two scenarios.
This difference is even codified in US criminal law where beating someone up due to race or ethnicity is classified as a hate crime. Now I know there are those who would say that the person has been beat up in both situtations (race and non-race), but I for one do approve of hate laws.
“There is something worse about putting up a damn that obliterates a culture and putting up a damn that moves hundreds of thousands of people out.”
Dan, don’t be Captain Obvious. Look, we were discussing the motive for relocation: is the motive the “hanification” or destruction of the Tibetan people? Or is it something else? While government policies may be unfair, or repressive, or evil, I don’t think they sit around thinking “How will we obliterate the Tibetans today?” I think they sit around saying “How do we increase Tibetan loyalty to the State?”, “How do we bring more economic opportunity to these impoverished farmers?” and “How do we get them to stop being so damn splittist?”
That’s not the same as “obliterate Tibet”. The reason people say things like “obliterate” is because ethnonationalism has been equated with identity, i.e. “If we don’t have a country, we don’t have an identity and we’ll shrivel up and die”. Personally, I think cultural identity is a little more robust than depending on having a nation-state. Do Tibetans deserve a nation-state? I have no problem with it. But the geopolitical reality is they aren’t getting one anytime soon.
Not that being nationalist is the only cause of Tibetan worries. There’s plenty the state would do anyway (control religious institutions, for example). But these are pretty much things that Han Chinese face as well.
Dave – a short reply since I’m not sure we are getting anywhere. “Cookie cutter” and “narrative” as you use them after all are cookie cutter terms. Journalists report on issues that interest them and the reader and, hopefully, are of general importance (not necessarily in that order). Tibetan ethnonationalism, identity, call it what you will, is one of them. Nation state or not, as you say, Chinese officials are sitting around and thinking how to enforce loyalty. When we journalists go to Tibet, we also report on other issues – recently I did a piece on global warming, Tim did something on Everest. But ethnonationalism is the most important Tibet-specific issue.
We don’t go to Tibet to report on China-wide issues because until now, and even now it seems, it’s very difficult to report from there so when you get to go you generally want to report on issues that you can only do in Tibet.
And I really can’t see what’s wrong with that.
I don’t know what more I can do to demonstrate that the relocation issue is an ethnonationalist issue, since you appear to admit.
You’re dead right on hanification. Horrible word. I won’t do it again. What I meant of course was the use of a number of means, including the introduction of large numbers of Han semi-permanent settlers, to enforce a Chinese identity on Tibet.
@Richard: We’re both coming at this at different angles and it’s making it hard to not talk past each other, I agree. Thanks for giving it a shot, anyway.
I guess I’d put it like this: if you took ethnonationalism out of the picture for a moment, you’d find that Tibetans are denied the right to self-organize, practice their faith unperturbed, be free of unfair arrest and detention, lack a democratic mechanism to influence regional policy, and are subject to the whims from on high in Beijing, etc. etc. I’m just saying these are all things Han Chinese suffer as well. What amplifies both the Tibetans own misgivings, and the governments harsh response, is ethnonationalism. In the Tibetans minds, if frames all of this in terms of foreign invaders. In the governments mind, it sows fear and paranoia that brings about stronger measures. I can’t prove that without ethnonationalism Tibetans would get no more flack than Han, or maybe less controversial ethnic groups like the Miao, but I suspect this is more or less the case. It certainly does make things worse.
Now I’m not saying ethnonationalism should be ignored. What I’m saying is that too often ethnonationalism is considered the center of the story, whereas I see it more as an added layer on top of what are more universal problems faced by all Chinese citizens regardless of ethnicity. When ethnonationalism is regarded as the primary and central issue, its at the cost of considering Chinese Tibetans as Chinese citizens, which they are regardless of how they feel about it, all of whom share similar fates. I’m also looking at this in the context of the Tibetan dissident movement as well, which has spent most of its time being extremely ethnonationalist to the point that Han Chinese are sometimes dehumanized. When the bulk of journalism on Tibet doesn’t apply any critical view to Tibetan ethnonationalism, it by default feeds it.
I understand the difficulties journalists face just getting in the region; I also understand deadlines, editors, word count, time constraints and the like. I just can’t help but noticing that while the Chinese government is viewed with an extremely critical and skeptical eye (as it should be), Tibetan ethnonationalism gets a free pass. Uyghur nationalism too, and I think a critical view of these things is a key part of the story.
Dave – agreed in fact on much of what you say. The authorities are remarkably consistent in their methodologies, which does indeed make Tibetan nationalism an extra “layer” or strand in a story which otherwise works across China. But it’s still an important layer. In a way I agree with you about nationalism – it can be dangerous under any circumstance. I remember hearing a (republic of) Irish guy saying he was opposed to nationalism in Northern Ireland because not because he liked the British but because he wanted it not to matter where the place was ruled from. Were China ever to split up, I can imagine the Han populations of Xinjiang and Tibet getting seriously worried, like Russians in eastern Europe. However, I don’t think things like that would go away just because we stopped writing about it, nor should we do so on the off chance.
Under current conditions, it’s hard not to sympathise with the Tibetans, and hard to find the case against them (the Chinese don’t offer a very good one, that’s for sure). I’m sure there are vices among Tibetan (and Uighur) nationalists that could be exposed. Perhaps you are right, perhaps an editor should commission someone to go and kick up dirt in Dharamsala. It’s pretty much impossible to do it from Beijing. Trouble is, it’s hard to imagine what dirt they could find that would match what we find on the other side when we do go to Tibet.
Really interesting article here Dave, and some good discussion. I know almost nothing about Tibet, so I’m not going to weigh in, but I’m interested to know more about the authorities in Tibet. Are the police / officials doing those home inspections likely to be Tibetans themselves?
(Some might say that doesn’t matter, because if they were they would be more or less false Tibetans -Is Han Hong a ‘real’ Tibetan?- I think that would be a lame objection)