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Max Fisher at The Washington Post ran a blog post last week featuring a world map of “racial tolerance” based on data from the World Values Survey (WVS), and it didn’t take long before the collective peer review power of Tufts University and Reddit found at least two examples of “fat fingers” where a “no, I don’t mind living next to other races” was mistakenly swapped with a “yes, I’m totally racist when it comes to choosing neighbors” for Bangladesh and Hong Kong, thanks to mistranslation and poor survey design. Others have pointed out the inherent flaw in assuming that the construct of “race” is universal and that news organizations’ need to feed the content beast creates a game of telephone where complex data is oversimplified and misinterpreted without real scrutiny.

I first encountered the WVS last year in my coursework on International Librarianship, where Geert Hofstede’s book Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind was used as a primary text and it served as solid jumping-off point for discussion. Hofstede is the granddaddy of cross-cultural studies quants, building a cross-cultural theory and corporate consulting brand out of data he developed as head of HR for IBM Europe in the 1960s, the same time Robert McNamara was using IBM mainframes to plot effective firebombing raids of Japan. Those were the salad days for punchcards. Like the WVS, Hofstede has survey datasets from dozens of countries over decades from which he and others glean tantalizing correlations (which so easily slip towards causation) between conceptual frameworks that “emerge” from the data (individualism vs. collectivism, for example) and GDP, economic growth, war, etc. At first, the book was fascinating as an American living in China – “wow, this validates so many things I anecdotally observe with hard data!” By the end of the book, however, I was completely disenthralled. The assumptions, generalizations, and seeming contradictions piled up in a doomed effort to render “national culture,” if such a thing is quantifiable, legible (yes, I’m finally reading Scott’s Seeing Like a State), looking like nothing more than the psychologist and sociologist equivalent to the old hack joke “White people drive like this, but black people drive like that!” Unless you’re a committed professional like Michael Harris Bond (who developed the original Chinese Values Survey) who will spend years wrestling with the data and appreciating its limitations, you’re better off watching Russell Peters.

Since everybody is talking about it, I have a question: if the Chinese state media are supposed to be such masters of message control, how come they didn’t think to use a 10 second delay? Or a full minute? It’s not like there’s much competition on the airwaves. And how prepped are their messengers? The anchor is panicky and I swear the analyst gulps. They’re spending 45 billion RMB to extend this around the world?

Less than 24 hours ago, George W. Bush became a Former President and for a while now there’s been the traditional tenure evaluation and the search for whether anything will positively contribute to his legacy. AIDS in Africa has been bandied around, and so has the U.S. – China relationship. January 1 was the 30th anniversary of formal bilateral ties between the two nations, and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte said the “relationship has never been better”, particularly holding out anti-terrorism as an example. Under Bush, the U.S. and China have certainly had good relations, surprisingly so considering the Hainan Incident and Bush’s stance towards China in the “Pre-9/11 world”, particularly involving missiles and Taiwan.

But Americans, particularly of certain political bents, might want to consider other ways Bush has moved the U.S. closer to China. Under Bush, the United States has detained Xinjiang Uighurs as enemies of the State, and then subjected them to interrogation procedures (insert personal definition of the word ‘torture’ here) derived from Chinese manuals in order to prepare them for interrogation by Chinese officials. As China Matters puts it, “In summary: we used Chinese torture techniques to soften up Chinese prisoners for Chinese interrogators.”As if that wasn’t enough, it appears that at least one released Uighur detainee has been listed by the Pentagon as “returning to the fight” against America for writing an op-ed to the New York Times.

How very close to China that feels. I can’t help but wonder if those dissidents and activists who lobby the U.S. president and Congress to bring change to China, many of whom personally know what Chinese detention is like, ever express concern in private that their adopted country was slipping into the same behavior as the country they seek to reform. They didn’t out in protest publicly, either.

There are other ways that the Bush administration has inched the United States closer to some of the policies of the PRC. Although American critics of China can be unbearably shrill and self-righteous at times, it seems to be true that China has 50 Cent gangs and other “CONTROL 2.0” schemes for “public opinion guidance”. So then, what are we to make of U.S. Air Force “counterblogging” tactics? If China’s alleged “grains of sand” strategy is so nefarious and dastardly, what of the Pentagon’s Minerva Initiative, which was inaugurated with Defense Secretary Gates asking academics to gather documents in other countries that could help intelligence services? What about the bribed newspaper columnists, the media military analysts briefed by the Pentagon on talking points, and Barry McCaffrey’s One Man Military-Industrial-Media Complex? And I nearly forgot the ongoing campaign to listen to all our phone calls. [UPDATE: and I did forget that the NSA and the Chinese government both want new UN measures to enable easier tracing of anonymous users on the Internet.]

Of course the U.S. and China have vastly different political structures. Of course there is a fundamental difference between a system where a current officeholder conducts himself this way, and a system where the office itself functions this way. And yet, if you are going to oppose such things on principle, then the U.S. has violated those principles, just as any country must be said to have done when it behaves that way.

It will be easy for many, should the Obama Administration live up to their expectations, to dismiss these events as an aberration, and focus only on the structural differences between the U.S. and Chinese governments. Those differences are real, and worthy of attention. But there is a lesson here that the U.S. and China are not on separate planes of political existence. Neither is uniquely exceptional, but rather both are susceptible to the same petty tyranny and insanity that can befall any nation. It would be helpful to remember that.

Photo via amatern @Flickr.

Rebecca Mackinnon has started a public wiki for predictions about China in ’09. The first entry is a post by Daniel Drezner whose blog just migrated to Foreign Policy. Drezner cites the recent Charter ’08 manifesto signed by hundreds of Chinese intellectuals and thousands of netizens, which calls for a new constitution, democratic reform and other extraordinarily ambitious changes. Drezner poses the question:

Question to readers: is 2009 the year that China’s government collapses? Or is it just another year in which there will be a crackdown of a mass uprising? Because those may be the only two options.

I agree with Matthew Stinson who points out in the comments to Drezner:

“The main problem with your thesis is the degree to which Chinese intellectuals can shape the discourse, rouse the public, and force policymakers to engage their ideas, and that degree is almost zero.”

Charter ’08 arguably has had a more significant impact on readers of the New York Review of Books than it has on China. Drezner’s position illustrates pretty well American conventional wisdom on China:

1) That for 20 years the Chinese government has been on its “last chance” with the Chinese people, and if it disappoints them, they will rise up and throw the bums out.

2) That the thousands of “mass incidents” reported around the country are warnings that they will carry out this ultimatum.

3) That it’s not a question of if the government will collapse but when, and that everything revolves around the idea of collapse either being imminent or delayed, but always present.

These assumptions ignore complications such as:

1) That the protests of 1989 were not nationwide, nor were they solely composed of students or calls for democracy. Jeffrey Wasserstrom has explicitly pointed out that the protestors were not the same as those in Eastern Europe which Charter ’08 takes its inspiration.

2) That the “mass incidents” around the country are not connected to any intellectual calls to reform, or directed at wholesale change of the national government. In fact, they are commonly directed at local officials and calls for the national government to come to the rescue.

3) The past twenty years, from a Chinese citizens perspective, were in fact revolutionary, and in general China has had quite a bit of revolution and its not exactly something desired.

Here, then, are my predictions for China in 2009 (or 2010, depending how the financial crisis plays out) in no particular order:

• As U.S. and UK retailers, as well as European ones, continue to cut back and even fail, China’s export model will come under increasing strain. The looming credit card crisis will reduce consumption even further, exacerbating the problem. While China has cash to lend on hand, there are no mechanisms by which it can use it to rescue thousands of small and medium sized manufacturers who operate with little spare cash. The government is attempting to use trade policy to buoy exporters, but this can only go so far if Americans have no money to spend.
• It will be extremely difficult for China to increase domestic consumption, not only as thousands lose jobs and unemployment increases, but also because problems with quality assurance in local brands will intensify as manufacturers cut corners even more to increase their shrinking margins and enforcement and regulation mechanisms are ineffective, or in many cases simply don’t exist. There are also bureaucratic hurdles such as permits and fees for imported equipment currently used solely for exports, though the government could waive this in a pinch.
• There will be increasing dissatisfaction and confrontation, but it will focus on education and healthcare, which have long been regarded as the biggest failures of Opening Up and Reform. Like many protests in the past, these will not call for the overthrow of the government but demand the government take action. Its been two years since President Hu Jintao acknowledged the collapse of the healthcare system, particularly in rural areas, but both healthcare and education have suffered similar problems in urban areas as well. First, there is the problem of rampant petty corruption. Second, and overlapping with the first, is that both have been driven purely by how much an individual can pay, either in bribes or by going to more expensive private schools and hospitals (which were mostly built with taxpayers money by public counterparts). It’s “One Country, Two Systems”, based on how wealthy you are.

The Chinese government seems to be aware of all of this, and has been trying to get a healthcare reform package together along with a social security number system. The last one is a mirror image of the U.S. social security number, which began only for tracking government benefits and later became the de facto ID number for legal and financial purposes. In China, its happened almost precisely the other way around. I expect to see the government making some very big noises about healthcare this year, but I’m not so sure education is being given as much priority. Nevertheless, during these past several golden years, Chinese citizens may have been more likely to grudgingly accept the costs of healthcare and education because they could afford them, or at least saw the promise of one day having enough money to afford them. In lean times, when the prospect of future earnings is dim, people may be less likely to accept the status quo and demand the government fix it. It will be interesting to see if this is linked to criticism of the Chinese government’s investment of foreign currency reserves.

The People’s Security Bureau in Shenzhen has told blogger Zuola couldn’t leave the country to attend the Deutsche Welle Blog Competition (where he would be a judge) because he’s a “may threaten state security” (“可能危害国家安全”). Then his twitter page got blocked by the Net Nanny, along with fellow activist bloggers Amoiist and Wenyunchao. The rest of Twitter remained accessible, and precision Twitter blocks haven’t been seen before*. You can read more about Zuola’s background and what his refused entry might mean over at Rebecca MacKinnon’s blog, which is also blocked, and has been for a while. Or rather, all subdomains of “blogs.com”, which hosts Rebecca’s blog, were blocked for quite a while. Now it’s just her. The same used to be true of all “typepad.com” subdomains. Now it’s just Letters From China that’s blocked, and McClathy newspapers Beijing correspondent Tim Johnson is unscathed. Blogspot was blocked on and off for ages, and is currently available – but not the GFW blog. Even Livejournal is fully available now. I don’t know if anyone is being blocked there, because frankly, it was blocked for so long I don’t think anyone in China still posts there except this guy, who has written about Zuola and the GFW, but perhaps the censors also assumed no one uses Livejournal.

So now at Twitter, Blogspot, Typepad and Blogs.com, blanket blocks have been replaced with precision blocks on blogs with “politically sensitive” content (all the examples above). If the blanket blocks are really going away for good, this is a good thing for three reasons:

1) The government is giving up on carpet blocking whole net neighborhoods, which is pretty heavy handed.

2) It opens up outside blogging platforms that don’t have an in-house censor shop to Chinese users.

3) It may sound weird, but it’s actually a good thing that it targets specific people, because we know who they are. In order to work, censorship has to keep alot of things vague and fuzzy, like what specifically can’t be said, what will happen if you say it, and who is saying it. When whole blog platforms were blocked, it was hard to know why. People often speculated that one blog said something that wasn’t looked favorably upon, and so the whole domain got harmonized. Now we don’t have to guess.

It’s not clear whether the precision blocks are based on keywords or the domain in some cases, but it seems likely that the latest Twitter blocks are not keyword based, simply because alot of people are retweeting Zuola and they aren’t getting blocked. Likewise Letters From China got a personal block a while ago, and there’s good reason to expect Rebecca got one of those.

Now I’d like to mention one of those little mysteries of the Net Nanny that I’d like to solve. For a while now I’ve noticed that quite a very random looking assortment of comic book and scifi related blogs are blocked. They all have their own domains and none seem to have ever had anything to say about China whatsoever. Do the censors have a problem with steampunk, speculative fiction and graphic artists? Or is still more bad aim?

———————————–

*use “https” and you’ll get through. The goes for mutantpalm.org as well. You’ll just have to accept my unvalidated security certificate, because I’m not going to pay for one.

Flickr Image Courtesy of Shizhao.

Via China Digital Times, Xinhua reports “China’s Public Security Ministry on Friday opened a website for citizens to verify individual identity cards. Any ID card can be verified for a 5 yuan (73 U.S. cents) online payment at the site, www.nciic.org.com, with a few seconds.”

Well, first mistake is the address, which ought to be www.nciic.org.cn, or www.nciic.com.cn (I don’t believe you can have a “.org.com” domain). Both resolve to the National Citizen Identity Information Center, established by the Ministry of Public Security in 2001, and the website has been around since 2003 according to the Wayback Machine (the .com.cn address; the .org.cn address seems to have been registered in late 2007). The second mistake is that the ability to check whether an ID number is legit or a forgery on the web or by SMS has been available for about three years. In September 2005, Xinhua reported (in Chinese) that individuals could verify ID numbers at NCIIC’s webpage or at www.id5.cn, another site from the same organization, or SMS the numbers 10695110, 10665110 or 9951 (for China Unicom users). ID5 has a neat Flash demo of how to use it on your phone. The internet and phone services both cost 5 RMB. And they promoted it again in April 2006. In February 2007, Xinhua announced the service again (in English) because the Population Management Information Database that the service queries had been completed in late 2006. But the one recent report states that according to sources in the Center, while major cities have joined the network, many other areas haven’t.

The current raft of stories about the service seem to focus on two concerns: that as a public service it ought to be free, and worries about privacy. In the 2006 Xinhua article, privacy concerns were addressed by an official who said that only the PSB could access details beyond the ID number, name and photo, and that the photos available on ID5 were too low quality to be used by forgers. The questions, though, may be why at the moment the “self-service” feature is on hiatus. It’s interesting, though, that it took 3 years of announcements before this caused a stir.

The National ID information network is actually quite significant. Unlike the U.S., where social security numbers have been centralized at the federal level as a form of ID, Chinese identity information has always been stored at a local level, in the hukou system, which is quite similar to the baojia system of the Qing Dynasty. This is one of the reasons China has so much graffiti advertising forgers – for pretty much the entire 20th century, it has been difficult for Chinese police, landlords or employers to verify if a non-local ID is genuine. While there are genuine concerns about Chinese authorities having too much information on citizens, it is worth noting that in many ways the Chinese system of local registration and documentation has been far less comprehensive, or effective, than Western societies.

There’s a new book about honeybee Colony Collapse Disorder, the unexplained disappearance of worker bees leading to the destruction of bee colonies throughout the world. A recent interview with the author of Fruitless Fall: The Collapse of the Honey Bee and the Coming Agricultural Crisis had this nugget (h/t Andrew Sullivan):

And then there’s human pollination, as they’re doing in China. (Take millions of peasants, hand them bundles of chicken feathers, and let them climb through the fruit trees, touching every flower with a bit of pollen from a bucket.)

I hadn’t heard of this before, but it’s used for cherry orchards in Shandong (see above right) and is quite common in Xinjiang, where migrant labor for the cotton and pear agribusiness (run by the Bingtuan, or Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps) is used to cross pollinate crops after winter and to develop new hybrid strains. Just one of the many jobs that predominantly Uighur migrant workers will not be doing anytime soon given the bottom is falling out of the cotton market. When you can’t even get this job, you’re bound to be rather unhappy.

This blog is currently migrating to www.mutantpalm.org.

It seems to be suffering some blockage due to keywords (I suspect), but you oughta be able to get there using https (SSL):

https://www.mutantpalm.org/

RSS Feeds here:

http://www.mutantpalm.org/?feed=rss
http://www.mutantpalm.org/?feed=rss2
http://www.mutantpalm.org/?feed=rdf
http://www.mutantpalm.org/?feed=atom

Those should work with https as well.

See ya there.

UPDATE: Rick Martin at Pandapassport and CNET’s Little Red Blog found a Youtube tutorial on Fanfou.

I’ve argued, citing the words of the Dalai Lama himself, that if you

1) Believe in democratic principles and free speech
2) You believe the Internet is a tool for unfettered global communication
3) There’s something in China (or any other country) that bothers you

Then you ought to put some energy into communicating directly with Chinese netizens about the problem. For years now I’ve seen alot of Chinese netizens discussions be completely ignored or simply missed by English-speaking netizens, who too often think that Chinese netizens are all completely brainwashed. Well, guess what? Some of them think you are too. Instead of dismissing each other as fools, how about we try to talk? So I say, Tweet Back! Tweet in English, alot of Chinese people know some. If you know Chinese… what are you waiting for? I’ve been translating alot of Chinese tweets on Tibet this weekend, and alot of them break the stereotype of the frothing nationalist Chinese blogger. These are Chinese people who adopt alot of Web 2.0 applications alot of the time, they aren’t just blowhards in chat rooms. Some are journalists, professionals and students.

Of course, this isn’t going to be easy. First steps usually don’t work so well. But its time to start trying some things instead of just throwing our hands in the air and dismissing the other side as brainwashed, indoctrinated or oppressed. There’s life out there folks, try making contact. You might be surprised. You might just learn something if you keep an open mind and try to hold a respectful dialogue despite your differences. Move out of your comfort zone, show some patience, and try to listen.

So here’s a quick tutorial to sign up for Fanfou. If you go on twifan.com and search for “Tibet” in English or “西藏”, which is Tibet in Chinese, you’ll find plenty of people to talk to. And you can always Fanfou me. My name there now is 八仙過海 means (Eight Immortals Cross the Sea).

Go to your homepage and its pretty much like Twitter. I realize this isn’t a full tutorial, but I wanna get this started. Also, you can put this link on your Firefox toolbar Zh -> En and when you view a Chinese page, press it to get an instant sloppy Google translation. It ain’t a great solution, but again, its a start, and these are short messages, so you may be able to get the gist.

Special Note: This is the perfect opportunity for Tibet internet activists like Oxblood Ruffin and concerned netizens everywhere to engage Chinese people on the Internet in discussions about what is going on. As I previously outlined in a primer to engage Chinese people, these are channels where one can register a free account and launch dialogues with Chinese individuals about Tibet. Many of the people I’ve included below are neither kneejerk nationalists or xenophobes, and some of them know some English too. It wouldn’t hurt to try. You can respond by clicking on the username link at the beginning of each tweet, sign up, and talk back.

To be updated periodically. Translations are rough and quick, suggestions helpful. (thanks to Feng37)

From Fanfou member 新闻触角:

发生在西藏拉萨的骚乱依然持续。有证据表明，这是达赖“藏独”集团暗中指示和操纵的破坏活动。根据最新获得 的电视画面显示，拉萨市浓烟滚滚火光冲天。不法之徒挥舞榔头、斧头砸毁店铺、银行、政府机关的玻璃和门窗，推翻或砸毁停放在路边的汽车，燃烧轮胎，人群中 有青年、学生和身穿宗教服饰的喇嘛。

[Events in Lhasa continue as before. There is evidence indicating the Dalai Lama “Tibetan Independence” group in secret has directed and controlled this sabotage. According to the latest TV broadcasts, a thick cloud of smoke is visible above Lhasa. Lawlessness is rampant, shops and banks have been trashed, government windows are smashed (or is it shuttered?), cars overturned, tires burning, there are crowds of youth, students and lamas.]

拉萨星期五发生大规模藏人抗议活动，公安部门下午一点左右开始戒严，所有居民不准外出，在拉萨街头已经看见军队车辆穿梭，坦克装甲车进驻群众示威的八角广场，政府派军队包围了拉萨最大的3所寺庙，封锁现场。新华社英文网站报道证实，警察使用了催泪弹，并且朝天鸣枪。

[On Friday there were large scale Tibetan protests in Lhasa, in the afternoon Public Security began to restrict the area, residents told not to go out, in the streets already see military troop transports, tanks and armored cars approach the demonstrators in Bajiao Square, government troops surround Lhasa’s three largest temples, seal off the area. Xinhua English reports confirm police used tear gas, in addition to warning shots being fired.]

带着鲑鱼旅行 我的妈呀，西藏出乱子了。内地新闻单位机构出入必须佩带证件。

[Mama mia, Tibet has gone nuts. Domestic news organizations must have proper credentials to go in and out.]

Wayne 三月十五日，西藏发生了自八九年以来最为严重的骚乱。

[March 15h, Tibet incident most serious incident since ’89]

阿企 @远骋 坚决反对藏独，但要给与藏民适当自治权

[@ YuanCheng (distance runner?) I firmly oppose Tibetan Independence, but want to grant Tibetan’s appropriate autonomous rights]

IQ小子 大多有关西藏的贴吧都被关闭了。

[For the most part Tibet related webpages are all closed.]

三儿 西藏又暴乱了 真的假的

[Tibet rioted again true or false?]

katly58 @shippo7 嗨 真不知道西藏哪几头家伙一直在作祟 好想灭了他们啊

[Sigh, really don’t know why these Tibetan guys constantly make trouble, best exterminate them]

shippo7 腾讯QQ封锁了有关西藏骚乱的信息，有相关关键字的信息对方收不到

[Tencent QQ shutdown related to Tibet incident messages, can’t receive messages with related keywords]

浪子 [中共] 你能对西藏仁慈点吗？ 2008-03-15 22:51

[Chinese Communist Party] Can you show Tibet a little mercy?

Shadow 西藏真的暴乱鸟，明天就不让说这个话题鸟…… 2008-03-15 20:26

[If Tibet is really rebelling, tomorrow we won’t be allowed to discuss this topic… …]

痛苦的信仰 向自由、民主的西藏斗志们致敬//Less talk and More work 2008-03-15 23:33

[For freedom, Democratic Tibet will fight on// Less talk and More work]

geuro 西藏是不是也成敏感词了 2008-03-16 11:08

[Is Tibet becoming a sensitive topic or not?]

oland 问了德国朋友问题，她怎么看西藏铁路，她说中国政府很聪明，既方便汉族人去西藏玩，又可以更简单的剥削藏族人。如果中国政府能有哪怕一点的人权，尊重他们的宗教，事情可能也许不会那么遭。我的回答是，法国对非洲的政策从来不是以自由民主和平为指导思想的，其他国家的范围可能小一些，但是做法有过之 2008-03-16 11:22

[Asked a German friend how she views the Tibetan railway, she said the Chinese government is really brilliant, they’ve made it convenient for Han to visit Tibet, while at the same time can exploit the Tibetan people. If the Chinese government had granted just one human right, and respected their religion, maybe things wouldn’t have turned out this way. My answer is, French policy in Africa was never based on democratic peace, other countries occasionally have(?), but they’ve done it this way before]

璐人甲 美国一朋友问我西藏为什么要暴动 2008-03-16 11:23

[American friend asked me why Tibet is rebelling]

oland 不平衡这个是事实，世界上到处都有不平衡，没人能解决这个问题，如果一个藏族的当地贵族家庭在北京没有收到贵宾待遇而在做些工艺品的小买卖，如果一个汉族的农民在西藏可以把持当地经济命脉，我倒是觉得这个世界有点奇怪的让人炫目。我不知道你归纳出来的，藏人到汉族地区只能做些手工艺品小买卖是一种 2008-03-16 11:33

[Inequality is a fact of life, there’s inequality all over the world, no one can solve this kind of problem. If a Tibetan family in Beijing sells handicrafts instead of getting treated like royalty, or if a Han peasant in Tibet dominates the local economy, I think this indicates the world is sometimes strangely confusing. I don’t see how you reach the conclusion that the only opportunity for Tibetans in Han areas is to sell handicrafts.]

兽兽 @oland 你问了一大圈英国、美国、印度人、IMF、World Bank，你干嘛不问问，由什么人控制经济命脉，西藏当地人怎么想。当地的妇女、僧侣、下层民众怎么想？ 2008-03-16 11:35

[@oland You keep talking about England, America, Indians, the IMF, World Bank, why don’t you ask who controls the economy, how Tibetan locals feel about it, or what women, monks, the lower classes, think about it]

LeafDuo 百度百科的 西 藏 词条被锁定，wiki 的 西藏 词条被半保护 2008-03-16 21:05

[Baidu Baike has locked out the term “Tibet” wiki has partially blocked the term]

GONG youtube访问不能,我想看台山交警事件,西藏事件,入联公投事件的视频啊… 2008-03-16 19:32

[Can’t visit youtube, I wanted to see videos of the Taiwan traffic incident, Tibet incident, the UN referendum (in Taiwan), arggghh]

Gerald 西藏、青海、甘肃等省区的主要官员，目前都在北京出席全国人大会议，他们能否准确掌握藏民示威抗议的诉求、骚乱的形成，将直接影响胡锦涛的最后决策。 2008-03-16 18:40

[Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu provincial leaders, presently all in Beijing attending the NPC meeting, they can’t adequately deal with the Tibetan protests, growing disturbances, will directly influence Hu Jintao’s final decisions]

浪子 历史上的西藏从来和中国都是暧昧着忽近忽远。也没有哪个民族，哪个个体和一个国家的关系就不可分割。还是那句老话：个人的命运个人决定，同样，一个民族的命运由那个民族的大多数来决定 2008-03-16

[Historically Tibet and China have always had a rocky relationship. No ethnic group or individual is inseperable from nations. Hence the old saying: one’s fate is one’s own choice, just as a peoples fate is decided by the majority of the people]