Month: October 2007

Wired Magazine has a story by Oliver August about his experiences with Chinese surveillance. While investigating the story of Lai Changxing, China’s most wanted man, August was detained in Fujian. He also came back to his office one day to find cables on his computer rearranged, and a piece of paper with his address written in unfamiliar handwriting. This comes on the heels of the Time China blog’s Bill Powell mentioning that a friend working for a metal bending company found a cell phone modified into a tracking device attached to the bottom of his car.

I’m having some difficulty pulling up this particular article on Wired without a proxy, while the rest of Wired loads fine. Anybody else have a problem?

China’s Dangerous Future? Or Poor Scholarship?

For a few years now, there have been periodic mentions in the press of a study on the potential threat posed by China’s impending surplus of young, unmarried males. In these stories, they have been described as a “geopolitical time bomb”, “bachelor bomb” and a threat to democracy. The source of this theory is a paper written in 2002 by Andrea Den Boer and Valerie Hudson entitled “A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia’s Largest States”, later expanded to book form in Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population, published in 2004. The study always seemed suspect to me, and after reading some of the supporting literature, I have a few ideas why.

Hudson and Den Boer define “surplus males” differently from “single men”, though many news articles on the topic use these interchangeably. The term “bare branches” refers to the Chinese word guanggun (光棍 ), or men without marriage prospects. Surplus males are the unintended consequence of son preference, as there aren’t enough women to go around for all of these favorite sons to marry. A “single man”, in contrast, has prospects for dating, marriage and reproduction. Bare branches are simply left out of the marriage market because supply doesn’t meet demand. Den Boer and Hudson estimate the number of surplus males by counting the difference between the number of men and women aged 15-34. By this reckoning, according to the US Census International Database, China had nearly 15 million surplus males in 1990. Using the sex ratio at birth, they estimate this will reach 30 million by 2020 – possibly 40 million if more generous birth ratios are substituted. the same Census tables, I calculate that current the number of surplus males is 14 million and change.*

Den Boer then go on to argue that surplus males, according to overwhelming literature, tend to be more aggressive, violent and criminal. I don’t really have a problem with arguing that unmarried single men in their twenties are often a bunch of hotheads. But they cite a study by Allan Mazur and company stating that testosterone levels, very much correlated with aggression, are higher in unmarried and divorced men. What they do not mention, however, is that Mazur’s study focuses on a reciprocal model for testosterone rather than the widely used basal model. In other words, the idea that testosterone levels are affected by being divorced or unmarried, as opposed to a man’s naturally high testosterone level affecting his chances of being divorced or married. Mazur et al. say that while the reciprocal theory better explains short-term T increases in Air Force veterans after divorce, the basal theory better explains overall likelihood of divorce. Moreover, they point out that one would expect a concentration of high-T men in lower classes, but in fact they are evenly distributed, pointing to an “invisible” stream of prosocial high-T men.

Basically, there’s a chicken-and-the-egg problem (do men lack a partner because they have high testosterone that makes them antisocial, or do men become antisocial because they have no partner?), as well as evidence that high testosterone does not necessarily make one antisocial, aggressive or violent. Like I said, I personally find it believable that young unmarried men are more likely to make trouble, but Den Boer and Hudson peg their argument on an evolutionary psychology model that seems to raise doubts.

Then there is the argument that when bare branches congregate its bad news, for which they cite David Courtwright’s Violent Land:

Men who congregate with men tend to be more sensitive about status and reputation. Even if they are not intoxicated with drink or enraged by insult, they instinctively test one another, probing for signs of weakness. . . . disreputable, lower-class males . . . exercised much greater influence in bachelor communities like bunkhouses and mining camps. They both tempted and punished, for to fail to emulate their vices was to fail, in their own terms, to be a man.

While this certainly describes, say, a frat party, it seems awfully reductionist, as does the emphasis on testosterone. Men are reduced to hormone driven robots of sorts. Den Boer and Hudson do not address factors such as family, economics, political events, moral codes, social policies or organizations, or indeed anything else that might affect the behavior of these men. I can’t help but be reminded of the dehumanizing labeling of child offenders as “superpredators” in the 1990s, or jokes about how a woman president would start a nuclear war during her time of the month.

They go on to say “It is possible that this intrasocietal violence may have intersocietal consequences as well.” This is where Den Boer and Hudson make the leap from an increase in crime due to surplus males to the supposition that it could increase the chances of war or other major forms of conflict. They give no citations, no footnotes and no supporting literature for this assertion. Instead, they then qualify their statement:

It is important to note that we are not claiming that the presence of significant numbers of bare branches causes violence; violence can be found in all societies, regardless of sex ratio. Indeed, to give but one example, the sex ratio of Rwanda in 1994 was normal. Rather the opportunity for such violence to emerge and become relatively large-scale is heightened by socially prevalent selection for bare branches. We see this factor as having an amplifying or aggravating effect. To use a natural metaphor, the presence of dry, bare branches cannot cause are in and of itself, but when the sparks begin to fly, those bare branches provide kindling sufficient to turn the sparks into a fire larger and more dangerous than otherwise.

While it is a lovely metaphor, this hardly seems a supportable claim. If they are simply stating that violence is “heightened” by the presence of bare branches, it begs the question: heightened compared to what? Remember that according to U.S. Census data, China has had about 15 million surplus males for at least the past 20 years. Shouldn’t we be seeing an increase in violence that can be demonstrably linked, or at least correlated to the male surplus population right now? There are the reports of increased mass demonstrations that are heard so often, but these have been increasing while the male surplus population has held steady, and there are plenty of other reasons for these protests (many of which involved women and older people), such as growing inequality, the rise of the Internet and cell phones, etc. etc. Plus the statistic itself isn’t at all reliable, as there are conflicting definitions of a “mass incident”. Den Boer and Hudson point to reports of high crime rates among migrant workers in China, who they believe share a large overlap with bare branches. But during this time the number of bare branches has remained steady. Other factors such as discrimination, lack of a social safety net, poor economic opportunities and the like can easily explain this. Do we even need an argument that testosterone is involved, and can this even be demonstrated?

Moreover, Den Boer and Hudson calculate it simply by subtracting the male population of 15-34 years of age from the corresponding female population. But there are other factors affecting the gender ratio. For one, prostitutes. Maureen Fan reports in the Washington Post that estimates of Chinese prostitutes range from 1 to 10 million. One estimate from 2001 mentioned by the Kinsey Institute says 3 million, which doesn’t seem unlikely. It doesn’t seem a stretch to assume that a majority of female sex workers will be in the 18-34 range, or that they are off the marriage market. Consider also that concubinage is not completely unknown at the moment and just a few years ago it was estimated that Hong Kong men alone have half a million children by mainland mistresses. So slap on another million, and you find China has been dealing with a surplus of nearly 20 million bare branches for at least a decade. Yet the effects and management of these surplus males through the years is not addressed at all in Den Boer and Hudson’s paper. Considering that China is hardly becoming instable right now due to violence, despite this surplus, one would assume that a) there is a tipping point at which the ratio becomes too imbalanced, which DB/H never suggest or b) there are some social or cultural factors at work that are mitigating the violence caused by surplus males. But DB/H explicitly state that the only way to reduce the violence is to reduce the number of surplus males, something that is not happening.

DB/H proceed to give three “suggestive” historical examples, one of which is the Nien Rebellion. A series of natural disasters led to widespread poverty and starvation in Huai-pei, which increased the level of infanticide and resulted in a sex ratio of 129 men to every 100 women, and as many as 25% of men were unable to marry at all. DB/H cite James L. Watson’s work on bachelor subcultures to point out that “unmarried men have little face to preserve because they do not command much respect in the community… these “bare sticks” had nothing to lose except their reputations for violence.” They claim that right now China is recreating “the vast army of bare sticks that plagued it during the nineteenth century”. But they quote Watson as also saying “most bare branches in his study were semiliterate and were third, fourth, or fifth sons whose families were too poor to offer them an inheritance. In many cases, these noninheriting sons were “pushed out” (tuei chu) of their fathers’ houses in their teens, and came to live in bachelor houses with groups of other unmarried youths. In their early twenties, they would move out of the bachelor house and in with a collective of men—a dormitory of workers, a monastery or religious brotherhood, or the local militia. In each case, they would spend much of their leisure time learning and practicing the martial arts.”

There are significant differences between this case study and modern China. First of all, the Nien Rebellion and the gender imbalance itself, by DB/H’s own description, were primarily the result of massive disasters and poverty. Whether the bare branches intensified the conflict seems unprovable – if you are married with a family you cannot feed, are you any less likely to join a rebel army in the hopes of providing for them? More importantly, in contemporary China, there are few 3rd, 4th or 5th sons. Most bare branches will be only or second children, and with China’s growing elderly population, it seems less likely they will be pushed out of the house to prove themselves. Rather, it seems quite likely they will be kept around the house to care for their aging parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles. If they migrate to work, they will still have parents dependent on them for support. Watson illustrates a clear role for social factors in the likelihood that these men will turn to violence – social factors that DB/H consider irrelevant later on.

And finally, monasteries and brotherhoods hardly play a role today like they did in the mid-nineteenth century. In later detailing some of the history of these groups, DB/H opine: “Given the high sex ratios of its society, perhaps the grave suspicion with which the current Chinese government views movements such as the Falun Gong is not entirely unfounded in light of this history.” The Chinese government probably does have groups like the Heaven and Earth Society in mind when they worry about Falun Gong, but it should be pointed out that Falun Gong has overwhelmingly appealed to the elderly, not angry young men. In this case it would be China’s growing elderly population that would be the source of trouble, not bare branches.

Perhaps roving bands of grannies might be the real problem

The most problematic assertion in DB/H’s paper is when they suggest that the presence of bare branches drives the development of authoritarian societies. Perhaps one could argue a surplus female population does too, since Hitler rose to power while Germany had around 2 million extra women. But here Den Boer and Hudson quote the work of Christian Mesquida and Neil Weiner: “Choice of political system made by the members of a population is somewhat restricted by the age composition of its male population.” However, they also quote Mesquida and Weiner’s conclusion:

“Our analyses of interstate and intrastate episodes of collective aggression since the 1960s indicate the existence of a consistent correlation between the ratio of males 15 to 29 years of age per 100 males 30 years of age and older, and the level of coalitional aggression as measured by the number of reported conflict related deaths.”

Mesquida and Weiner do indeed name a tipping point for major conflict, and allow for mitigating circumstances – unlike Den Boer and Hudson:

“Populations with ratios of young males exceeding 60 per I00 males 30+ are predicted to move toward a state of internal or external conflict, unless there exist particular mitigating circumstances such as an extremely rapid increase in resource availability or new possibilities to migrate to more productive environments.”

If one looks at U.S. Census data comparing the ratio of 15-34 year old males to 35+ year old males (weighing the ratio even more in Den Boer and Hudson’s favor than Mesquida and Weiner’s original age groupings) in China from 2000-2020, it is clearly steadily decreasing as China’s population grays. In 1996, the ratio of younger men to older was 104:100, which by Mesquida and Weiner’s scale ought to have provoked a major conflict. In 2005, the ratio was closer to 75:100. In 2020? 65:100. By Mesquida and Weiner’s argument, the chances of China’s sex ratio causing problems in the future are less, not more, than the past decade. Den Boer and Hudson’s references to Robert Wright’s The Moral Animal and Laura Betzig’s study of the link between despotism and polygyny (men hoarding wives and mistresses), since they infer that these works argue that gender imbalances are only governable by authoritarian regimes, when both seem only to suggest that there is a correlation between imbalanced sex ratios and authoritarianism – not that only one can deal with a preponderous of men.

Den Boer and Hudson’s prescribe “there is only one short-term strategy for dealing with a serious bare-branch problem: Reduce their numbers. There are several traditional ways to do so: Fight them, encourage their self-destruction, or export them.”

The assumption here is that non-spousal family obligations, non-violent forms of single male social engagement, increased economic opportunity and other social support mechanisms count for nothing. Surplus males cannot be made into productive members of society, and therefore must be eliminated. It seems grossly reductionist but is a natural conclusion given all the ignored factors previously mentioned.

Similar criticisms have also been raised before in the Chronicle of Higher Education.

One case study that Den Boer and Hudson don’t explore at all is the Chinese bachelor subculture that existed in nineteenth century America. According to Thinkquest, “In 1860, the sex ratio of males to females was already 19:1. In 1890, the ratio widened to 27:1. For more than half a century, the Chinese lived in, essentially, a bachelor society where the old men always outnumbered the young.” Chinese immigrants did indeed represent a disproportionate number of arrests and criminal activity, but there were such aggravating factors such as the racist violence perpetrated against them. Some have argued that Chinese were still less prone to violence despite mob violence against them. Moreover, there is a great deal of evidence that “”public officials and the general public” accepted [Chinese on Chinese] “interpersonal violence … [as] to a large extent a private matter””. Den Boer and Hudson could argue that this is an example of a government (though I wonder if they would characterize California officials as “authoritarian”) allowing bare branches to destroy one another. But one could just as easily suggest that with proper law enforcement and a lack of discrimination, these immigrants would not have been anywhere near as violent. But if one accepts that these men are unstoppably driven to be violent, as Den Boer and Hudson argue, then there wouldn’t be any reason to help them.

Available on eBay: The Chinese Must Go mechanical cast iron cap pistol

* It should be noted that I consulted the China Statistical Yearbook as well, but found that according to their, the 18-34 population actually has a tiny surplus of females, not males. Also perplexing was that, when totaled, the number of currently married women exceeded the number of married males by several million. To my knowledge there are nowhere near that many Chinese women married to foreigners (who remain Chinese citizens counted in the census). Anybody know why?

The Washington Post has an interesting article on Iraqi and other “immigrants” in China, particularly in Yiwu, Zhejiang. The thrust of the article, titled “Chasing the Chinese Dream”, is that “For a growing number of the world’s emigrants, China — not the United States — is the land where opportunities are endless, individual enterprise is rewarded and tolerance is universal.” The article then goes on to undermine this more or less completely towards the end by mentioning that these “immigrants” couldn’t even bury one of their dead in China, and only 700 foreigners have the equivalent of a green card.

Anyway, I was struck by this bit:

Over the past 20 years, the government has gradually allowed its own Muslim minority to rebuild institutions that were devastated by state-sponsored attacks on Islam during the Cultural Revolution. Islamic schools have opened, and scholars of Islam are being encouraged to go abroad to pursue their studies. Unlike Christians, China’s estimated 20 million Muslims are considered an ethnic minority, a status that confers certain protections and privileges.

OK… uh, China still confiscates passports to prevent Uyghurs from going on the Hajj, bans students, children and those employed by the government (which is alot of people in Xinjiang) from attending mosques, and all schools and imams are licensed and controlled by the state.

But even more wrong is the assertion that Muslim is “an ethnic minority” and the false comparison to Christianity. This is a misunderstanding that probably arose because one particular ethnic group associated with Islam, the Hui, are often called “Muslim Chinese”. While the Hui are historically defined by their religion, as an ethnic group, they are defined by heritage. You are Hui if your mom and/or dad was Hui. You cannot convert to Hui, though there are Chinese citizens who dig up any scrap of minority ancestry they can so they can miss out on the One Child Policy. Also, you are still Hui even if you don’t follow Islam, and many do just that.

The other problem with stating Muslim is “an ethnic minority” is that Muslims in China are found amongst various ethnic groups. Specifically, besides the Hui, there are the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Bonan and Tatars.

And then there’s the bizarre Case of the Hui Tibetan, and in fact the Muslim Tibetan as well. This distinction is based on the legend of a Muslim named Pir Jacob, who came from the West and was granted land to build a mosque by the Fifth Dalai Lama after he spotted Jacob through a telescope. The Hui Tibetans, on the other hand, were Muslims who came to Tibet from China Proper to the East. The two groups have moved closer together in recent history.

Poster from the Tuku Archive

The First Born was a stage play written in late 19th century San Francisco by Francis Powers. It was later made into a film in 1921. The New York Times described the story:

Even though most of the actors are Caucasian, with the exception of star Sessue Hayakawa, this tragic romantic drama tries to remain true to the spirit of the Orient (or at least what white folks assumed it was like). Loey Tsing, the first love of Chan Wang, is sold into slavery by her father. Although Chan marries another, he still loves Loey; only the birth of a son relieves his unhappiness. He adores little Chan Toy even though he finds nothing to like about his wife. Through his job running a lumber yard in San Francisco, Chan comes to the home of a wealthy Chinaman, Man Low Yek. It turns out that he is Loey Tsing’s master. When Man Low Yek sees the two together, he angrily swears revenge and invites Chan’s unfaithful wife up to the house. She brings Chan Toy, and the frightened little boy falls out a window. Chan finds him crumbled and dead and is overcome with grief. Through the use of his wiles, he causes the death of both Man Low Yek and his wife. Then he and Loey Tsing return home to China together.

In The Production and Consumption of Chinese Theater in Nineteenth Century California, Daphne Lei argues that the original production involved the “first Chinese actor to appear on the English speaking stage in the U.S.” According to scholar Lois Rather, Kim Poon, “a product of local schools”, played the friend of the title character. Unfortunately, at the time it was not clear if Kim Poon was the name of the actor or the character he played, and he did “not have any significant lines, except for some ‘laughter and Chinese exclamations’ like “Hi la, hi la”. It is ironic that the first Chinese actor on the English-speaking stage was a non-speaking character.”

The play was a huge hit, and toured New York and London. On October 6, 1897, a New York Times critic wrote:

The two scenic pictures, representing a street in Chinatown in the bustle of a noonday, and an alley at night with contiguous gambling houses and opium dens, are such as impress the spectator with a sense of reality… it, first of all, pictures the routine of life among the Mongolians of the Pacific coast, but it involves a simple, tragic story which is characteristic of the race, as we Westerners understand it… The music … is performed by a band of thirty-two musicians (some of them armed with Chinese instruments)… The pantomime is expressive and interesting, and all so strange that the spectator shivers a bit, though the sight of the steeple of a nearby Christian church rising above the joss-house is reassuring… The chatter is all in Chinese. There is some sort of trouble about a boycott of one Man Low Yek, ordered by the highbinders… A party of “white devils” is “slumming” in Chinatown that night. The spectator feels that he is one of the party, and enjoys special privileges.

The term “highbinder” is one with a murky origin. The American Heritage Dictionary lists its definition as a “corrupt politician” and a “A member of a Chinese-American secret society of paid assassins and blackmailers.” It lists the etymology as “After the Highbinders, a group of ruffians in New York City c. 1806.” By the late 19th century, it had become a term not only for Chinese gangsters, but for Chinese people in general:

Types of Highbinders, from The Wasp, 1901-02

Highbinder weapons circa 1900

The Linguistlist listserv had a thread about it, pointing out

It may be that the Chinese ‘highbinder’ has a discrete origin: thus Asbury _Barbary Coast_ (1933) 185: ‘The _boo how doy_, popularly known as hatchetmen or highbinders, received regular salaries, with extra pay for exceptional bravery in battle.’ Asbury discusses them at length in the succeeding pages but essays no further etymology. ‘Boo how doy’ literally, at least in his translation, means ‘fighting men’.

In 1886, Harpers Weekly had a whole article about highbinders (from the excellent HarpWeek archives):

When the Chinese began to flock to California in large numbers, attracted by gold mining and the promise of work on the overland railroad, they formed for mutual protection what are known as the Six Companies. These were fashioned on the principle of trade guilds. The men from Canton, for instance, formed one company, those from Hong-Kong another. The members paid regular dues, for which the society furnished them hospital care when sick, and guaranteed that their bones should be carefully transported to China in case of death. They were also to be aided in any difficulty with Chinese of other companies or with whites. The company rooms were the head-quarters for the members, where they could get the latest news from China. Outgrowths of these companies, but independent of them, are the Highbinders’ societies… Though known as Freemasons, the Highbinders are really banded together for black-mail and police purposes. If by any factor the confidence of a Highbinder is won, he will have no hesitation in acknowledging that he lives by black-mail…

The mother society among the Highbinders is the Chee Kung Tong, which occupies a substantial three-story building on Spofford Alley, in the heart of the Chinese Quarter of San Francisco… The influence of the head society is far-reaching, and it is doubtful whether its leaders would heed any order from a lesser source than the Chinese Consul. It is even said that the Consul’s order has sometimes been overruled, as there are men in the Chee Kung Tong who acknowledge no allegiance to China… The Highbinder is almost entirely beyond the pale of American law. His secret hiding-places defy the ingenuity of the police; he holds an oath in court in contempt; he can get a score of witnesses in his society to swear to anything which he desires; he has been the chief cause of the difficulty in the enforcement of the Restriction Act in San Francisco.

The Chee Kung Tong, or Zhigongtang (致公堂), was an anti-Manchu organization that would later give critical financial support to Sun Yatsen. While I believe it did have ties to the Heaven and Earth secret society, I seriously doubt it would’ve listened to the Qing Imperial Consul. I’d also point out the Restriction Act mentioned at the end – at this time, Chinese were denied citizenship and even had it taken away (the Chinese Exclusion Act wouldn’t be officially repealed until 1943). As a result of Chinese exclusion, communities had to build their own networks for language, housing, employment, medical care, etc.

Anyway, the play The First Born would appear in London in November of 1897. The New York Times was on hand again, and reported the Chinese ambassador witnessed the performance. It’s not clear who it was who attended the performance, but at the time the Chinese embassy to Britain included some prominent Chinese officials, such as Luo Fenglu and Chen Yifan (who in 1914 refused to sign the Simla Convention on Tibet). Another was Zhang Deyi, who, like Luo Fenglu, was from Fujian, and like Chen Yifan, was a graduate of the Tongwenguan. He accompanied the first fact-finding missions to Europe and America, and wrote about them in the books Strange Tales from across the Ocean 《航海述奇》、More Strange Tales 《再述奇》、and Eight Strange Tales 《八述奇》. Some of these were translated in Diary of a Chinese Diplomat, now out of print. I wonder if Zhang Deyi or his colleagues ever wrote about that play. It’d be fascinating to read their perspective.

From the difficult to navigate but very fascinating Tuku historical photo archive:

This six billion yuan banknote was issued in 1949 by the nominally Guomindang government of Xinjiang. Inflation was pretty bad. A few people on the Chinese ‘net seem to think this is the largest numerical banknote ever issued in the world, but I know their wrong because I own one of these from the last days of Yugoslavia:
After the Communists took over Xinjiang, alot of people weren’t using cash. They were the scrip issued by the Bingtuan, the military veterans who were mobilized in Xinjiang to develop agriculture (and secure the borders).

Watching the transition of power in China, October 1907:

THE CHANGES IN CHINA.

October 13, 1907, Sunday

Predictions have been freely made of late that the approaching abdication of the Dowager Empress would be the signal for internal commotions in China amounting to a revolution, and possibly the breaking apart of the empire through the effort of the Chinese race to unseat the ruling Manchus. For this reason, it is inferred, and indeed proclaimed by the highest authority, the throne is bent on dissolving the distinctions, superficial and fundamental, between the two races, and resolved upon liberal reforms that will modernize China. The imperial decree of October 1 declared that preparations should be made to give China a constitution. Secretary Taft, in his speech at Shanghai, spoke in warning of “radical and sudden reforms”, but he advocated a reform along lines of internal development, education, the enlargement of trade, and predicted that this would increase commerce and advance friendly relations with this country.

The gradual reform programme of the Dowager Empress and her advisors is China’s hope in the impending crisis. A sudden cleavage from the past would bring into powerful antagonism the adherents of traditional power and the more zealous forces of reform. There is no question that civil war is feared by the reigning family…

The fleet of the United States will remain in Pacific waters during the months preceding the abdication of the Dowager Empress, which is set for the Chinese New Year. Whether our warships are sent merely on a “practice cruise” or in view of complications with Japan, or because of coming events in China, it is certain that they will be in a position of advantage should anything happen to conflict with the American policy of the “open door”…

Our Secretary of War refused to speculate upon the probable action of the United States in case the interests of American merchants were placed in jeopardy, but he did say:

“It is clear that our merchants are being roused to the importance of the Chinese export trade and they would view with deep concern any and all political obstacles to its maintenance and expansion. This feeling is likely to find expression in the action of the American government.”

From Asia Times Online, today, Multinationals Fear US-China Trade Wars:

The US Congress is about to enact legislation that would levy punitive duties on Chinese goods. This could lead to unintended consequences for both American consumers and the wider US economy.

Some 119 leading multinational companies agree – including Boeing, Citigroup, General Motors, and Microsoft. They have called on Congress to reject protectionist legislation against China, arguing that “imposing unfair barriers to trade in the name of currency valuation or product safety is not a solution to the underlying concerns”. It was “a vote for free trade”, reported the state-owned China Daily, which, as so many other Chinese observers do, argues that rising protectionism among some US lawmakers “seriously threatens the interests of China, the United States itself and the world at large”.

Again, in October 1907:

A REFORMER IN CHINA.; Achievements of Yuan-Shih-Kai Attracting Wide Attention.

October 29, 1907, Tuesday

WASHINGTON, Oct. 28. — Another Li Hung-Chang has arisen in China and his achievements are attracting attention throughout the civilized world. He is Yuan-Shih-Kai, formerly Viceroy of Chih-li, now President of the Wei-Wu-Pu, or Board of Foreign Affairs at Peking. He assumed the reins of Government in Chih-li at a time when chaos and disorder prevailed in the province… During Mr. Yuan’s term as governor, Mr. Ragsdale [American Consul-General] says he established the best of relations with foreigners, and by sturdy honest efforts won the goodwill of the natives as well. His advice, even then, was sought by Peking, and the best edicts were the result of his suggestions. Notable among these were the promises of efforts toward Constitutional government, and those relating to the suppression of the opium traffic.

Yuan Shikai, six years later*, would dissolve the national assembly, and in 1915, declare himself emperor. Today, Will Hutton wonders if one of Hu Jintao’s successor will be China’s Gorbachev.

In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev’s readiness to question communism was intertwined with his membership of the Soviet Union’s fifth generation of leaders. He did not champion perestroika and glasnost alone; much of the nomenklatura had decided that the Soviet economic and social model was dysfunctional, corrupt and endemically inefficient and had to change.

Will one of Hu Jintao’s two ‘Lis’, as the frontrunners to succeed him, Li Keqiang and Li Yuanchao, are popularly known, feel the same way as they walk out in front of the cameras in the Great Hall of the People on Friday? Will one prove to be China’s Gorbachev?

*In 1913, the New York Times also reported that Yuan Shikai’s brother was growing opium illegally.